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Abstract
This project empirically explores civil litigation from its inception by examining
the content of civil complaints. We utilize spectral cluster analysis on a newly compiled federal district court dataset of causes of action in complaints to illustrate the
relationship of legal claims to one another, the broader composition of lawsuits in trial
courts, and the breadth of pleading in individual complaints. Our results shed light
not only on the networks of legal theories in civil litigation but also on how lawsuits
are classified and the strategies that plaintiffs and their attorneys employ when commencing litigation. This approach permits us to lay the foundation for a more precise
and useful taxonomy of federal litigation than has been previously available, one that,
after the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (2007) and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009), has also arguably never been more relevant than it is today.
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The idea of ‘a plain and short statement of the claim’ has not caught on. Few
complaints follow the models in the Appendix of Forms. Plaintiffs’ lawyers,
knowing that some judges read a complaint as soon as it is filed in order to get
a sense of the suit, hope by pleading facts to ‘educate’ (that is to say, influence)
the judge with regard to the nature and probable merits of the case, and also
hope to set the stage for an advantageous settlement by showing the defendant
what a powerful case they intend to prove.
—Judge Richard Posner,
American Nurses Ass’n v. Illinois (1986)
Judge Posner’s opinion in American Nurses illustrates the dilemma of the complaint
drafter. Attorneys often want to tell a story in their pleading – to frame the litigation
favorably for an attentive judge or her clerk. But the stories that unlock the courthouse door
change. Once judges appeared to prefer Hemingway’s concise prose, as “[t]he draftsmen of
the Civil Rules proceeded on the conviction, based on experience at common law and under
the codes, that pleadings are not of great importance in a lawsuit” (Wright, Miller and
Kane 2002). But it’s now evident that William Gaddis is a better lodestar. After lower
court decisions in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, reams of scholarship, and the Supreme
Court’s eventual input in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009),
well-counseled plaintiffs will create a detailed and plausible factual narrative, despite what
the Rules say. Indeed, plaintiffs’ complaints are said to be more important now than at
any time since the drafting of the Rules in the 1930s. But, given selection effects, pleading
strategy is as difficult as ever to study systematically.
In this paper, we focus on a particular aspect of the pleading story: the channeling by
plaintiffs of their factual narrative into particularized legal claims, or causes of action. These
causes of action exemplify the cross-cutting tensions of pleading writ large. The rules of civil
procedure nominally permit liberal joinder of claims in one suit, and the failure to plead a
particular legal claim will often lead to preclusion in later cases. However, increased judicial
skepticism of private plaintiffs, and consequent doctrinal changes in pleading, counsel against
bringing causes of actions which the facts do not immediately suggest (Miller 2010). Thus,
though the parties may still cast a wide net, it seems likely that the more strategically wise
1

choice is to be attentive to the relationship between causes of action, and to attempt, to the
extent possible, to frame a coherent nexus of causes of action in a particular complaint.
To better understand this problem, we collected and culled a set of over 2000 federal
complaints and coded the alleged causes of action in each. We then analyzed the relationship
between these complaints based on their underlying causes of action – over 7400 of them
– using spectral clustering. Cluster analysis provides a means to objectively classify large
datasets and has been widely used for the sorts of taxonomic exercises that are critical
foundational work in many sciences. In this present study, cluster analysis allows us to
describe and summarize civil complaints, in isolation and in relationship to one another, in
ways that previous work simply could not do. Our analysis demonstrates that there are
stable relationships between the causes of action found in this set of complaints - indeed,
we find that causes of action cluster into eight typical patterns. These patterns permit us
to develop a more precise and therefore useful taxonomy of federal litigation than has been
previously available.

I.

Complaints and Causes of Action

A.

From Writ to Cause of Action
At the heart of doctrine lies the cause of action. In every American jurisdiction,

parties may join together distinct theories which they believe justify legal relief. That is,
they may bring multiple causes of action; they may even join federal and state legal theories
together in federal court if they “form part of the same case or controversy under Article
III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). But this modern cause of action
practice is a relatively recent procedural innovation.
In their original incarnation, the ancient system of writs coincided with distinctive
theories of legal relief. As Bracton wrote, “there may be as many forms of action as there
are causes of action” (Plucknett 1956, 37). Each writ was issued in response to fact patterns
2
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which reoccurred, and particular writs came to be used for common complaints. Over
time, these patterned writs were fixed – fact patterns had to be shaped to fit the available
procedural formula. Judges also greatly restricted the joinder – that is, the ability to bring
together distinct legal theories in one “case” - of distinct writs. The resulting system was
arcane, technical, and extremely expensive to access (Hepburn 1897).
New York’s famous Field Code sought to replace this obscure system and start afresh.
It employed the term “cause of action” to describe those groupings of facts that would result
in judicial intervention. The term originally therefore implied that the plaintiff had identified
a set of circumstances for which there was a known remedy (Subrin 1987). Even so, the
Field Code limited joinder of these causes of action based on the substantive legal nature
of each (Hazard 1988). For example, New York permitted the joinder of just seven general
kinds of action in one complaint: contracts; injuries by force to person or property; injuries
without force to person or property; injuries to character; claims to recover real property;
claims to recover personal property; and claims against a trustee (N.Y. Laws, c.379 (1848)).
Arguments over joinder bedeviled theorists, who viewed the intellectual incoherence of the
term “cause of action” as a precipitating cause (Gavit 1930).
Reflecting this hostility, Charles Clark, the reporter for and force behind the original
Federal Rules, believed that the cause of action was nothing more (or less) than “an aggregate
of operative facts, a series of acts of events, which gives rise to one more legal relations of
right-duty enforceable in the courts” (Clark 1924). Over time, this realistic conception of the
cause of action came to dominate, providing the architecture for the innovative federal rules
regime (Bone 1989; Sherwin 2008). The Rules famously avoid the term “cause of action”
entirely, instead focusing on a “claim for relief,” and the type of factual notice that would
apprise the defendant of the nature of the theories arrayed against it. That is, as originally
proposed, the federal rules do not require plaintiffs to plead causes of action at all, and Rule
18, which governs joinder, enables bringing together theories of relief without regard to the
underlying doctrinal categories which had dominated practice. Since most states’ procedural

3
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codes are modeled on the federal rules, one might have imagined that the cause of action,
like the writ, was extinct.

B.

The Modern Practice and Theory of Multiple Claim Pleading
But nothing could be further from the truth. Most lawyers continue to plead inde-

pendent causes of action in both federal and state court. They do so for many reasons.
Primarily, the conservative nature of local legal culture demotivates changes to traditional
pleading practices (Main 2001), and lawyers are told that increasing the number of causes
per case will lead to higher rates of recovery (Berger, Finkelstein and Cheung 2005; Eisenberg
2007). That lesson begins in law school, where professors teach students to channel fact patterns into discrete causes of action, framed by courses like “Tort,” “Contract,” “Employment
Law,” or “Property.” Important jurisdictions also continue to model their pleading rules on
the Field Code, and lawyers may fairly believe that they are safer complying with that more
restrictive set of rules in all complaints. The 1993 Federal Rule Amendments may have
encouraged broad pleading by requiring mandatory disclosure of “claim or defense” relevant
evidence. Finally, claim splitting may result in preclusion in a later filed case (Restatement
(Second) of Judgments §24 (1982)). Thus, there were traditionally few immediate costs in
most cases to pleading as many specific causes of action per complaint as a clever lawyer
could possibly imagine.
“Few,” but not none. Plaintiffs wishing to preserve their choice of forum must plead
carefully: for instance, an explicit (or lurking) federal cause of action may enable removal
from state court.1 And over-pleading may irritate the trial judge. Emphasizing how common
cause-of-action-centered pleading is, courts often complain that overpleading law obscures
the merits, permitting plaintiffs to avoid investing in their cases early on and winnowing
1

Additional strategic complexities abound. Class action plaintiffs are motivated (particularly post-CAFA)
to limit the number of causes of actions in their complaints and thus decrease the number of potentially classdefeating individual issues. Conversely, “master complaints” in MDL cases will contain numerous causes of
action to increase the size of the consolidated case.

4
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2045733

their theories of relief. The federal reports are full of such laments, emphasizing Rule 8(a)’s
command that a complaint be short and plain. In Cesnick v. Edgewood Baptist Church
(1996), the exasperated Eleventh Circuit noted that a complaint was “so muddled that it
was difficult to discern what the appellants [were] alleging beyond the mere names of certain
causes of action.” In Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol. (2008), the Court lamented
that “[i]f the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could read the record in this
case - beginning with the plaintiffs’ complaint . . . they would roll over in their graves.”
Though noting that dismissals for prolixity are supposed to be rare, the Ninth Circuit recently
cautioned a plaintiff that it was unfair to “burden her adversary with the onerous task of
combing through a 733 page pleading just to prepare an answer that admits or denies such
allegations, and to determine what claims and allegations must be defended or otherwise
litigated” (Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. General Dynamics C4 Systems (2011)).2 Plainly, district
courts don’t enjoy the task of “wast[ing] half a day in chambers preparing the ‘short and
plain statement,’ which Rule 8 obligated plaintiffs to submit” (McHenry v. Renne (1996)).
All of which is to say: from the passage of the federal rules until quite recently,
liberal joinder and liberal pleading combined to recommend that attorneys set forth as many
causes of action as they felt would pass a very loose (but not nonexistent) judicial scrutiny.
Whether recent changes in judicial views on pleading will or have changed attorneys’ practices
regarding causes of action is a topic we will explore later in this paper.

II.

Data
To study causes of action empirically, we first developed a large database of civil

complaints. As noted above, this project focuses exclusively on the study of federally2

Many dismissals resting on Rule 8(a) will result from a motion for a more definite statement, or an initial
motion to dismiss under Rule 12, will be without prejudice. A similar effect will obscure our understanding of
the effect of Rule 11 sanctions, which may be imposed when plaintiffs have failed to reasonably investigate the
factual basis of their claims. It is highly unlikely that trial judges will write opinions on such nondispositive
orders. That is, simply because we observe few opinions relying on Rule 11 or Rule 8, does not mean that
those Rules do not meaningful influence attorney practices on the ground.

5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2045733

litigated complaints. While this ensures that lawyers are playing by the same rules when filing
their cases, something that is desirable from an experimental standpoint, it is also a practical
requirement for a project with data coming directly from a large number of complaints.
Unfortunately, state court complaints remain difficult and expensive to retrieve in large and
representative numbers, something that presents certain generalizability limitations to any
empirical study, like ours, that focuses exclusively on federal trial courts.

A.

RECAP Complaint Data
Truly random selection of federal complaints remains nearly impossible, since, for

example, many complaints are not available electronically, paper complaints are archived
around the country, and the traditional retrieval of a large sample of them (electronically or
not) would be cost-prohibitive. To gather our federal district court complaints, we turned
to RECAP, a free digital archive of federal district court and bankruptcy case documents
developed in 2008 by the Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University.
RECAP’s repository is sourced through internet users of PACER (“Public Access to Court
Electronic Records”), the federal judiciary’s pay service for accessing electronic court records.
The RECAP database now contains over 5 million federally filed documents, a number that
represents approximately 1 percent of PACER’s current library.3
Within the RECAP electronic database, we identified approximately 80,000 electronically available civil complaints, from which we could retrieve unique identifying information
like a case’s district name and docket number.4 Our goal with these RECAP complaints was
3

RECAP obtains electronic documents from federal courts when individuals install an extension into their
Firefox internet browser which, after installed, transfers a copy of any file downloaded from PACER into
the RECAP file sharing directory. RECAP was seeded with several million documents in 2009, when Aaron
Swartz, a 22-year-old Stanford dropout, entered a library at which the government had begun a free trial of
PACER (Schwartz 2009). Swartz managed to download around 20 percent of the entire PACER database
at that time which amounts to 19,856,160 pages of text.
4

The presence of a federal complaint in the RECAP database and our sample does not guarantee that
it is the original, pre-amendment(s) complaint. However, where multiple complaints from a single case were
available, we coded the original filing. Within our data, 99 percent of our coded complaints were the original.
In the few instances when we relied on an amended complaint, it was because the original complaint was

6
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to build a dataset that somewhat resembles the population of civil complaints filed in (or
removed to) federal courts. To do this, we selected a stratified sample of 2,500 complaints
from the RECAP database based on an estimation of filed cases’ issue areas.5 Specifically,
we used the “nature of suit” (NOS) code, a single-issue code that is designed to serve as a
summary of a case identified by the plaintiff’s attorney at filing, to develop a sample that
roughly reflects the Administrative Office of the U.S. Court (AO) database’s overall distribution of NOS codes, and thus rough issue areas in lawsuits, in federal district courts.
According to Eisenberg and Schlanger (2003), “for researchers seeking to identify all federal
district court cases in a certain subject matter category, it is clear that the AO database
[and its NOS code variable] is the easiest, and perhaps the most reliable, method of doing
so . . .”6 After the selection of our 2,500 complaint sample, we found and removed two
duplicate complaints (based on docket-number errors; most duplicates were identified prior
to the 2,500 case sample) and 62 complaints with no non-relief causes of action. We also
excluded 427 cases because they were a part of multidistrict litigation (MDL) and, as such,
were likely subject to a different pleading process and overall litigation strategy than other
not available. For purposes of the clustering, these amended complaints were treated identically to original
complaints.
5

Before the selection of our 2,500 case sample, we excluded prisoner habeas petitions and social security
complaints as well as those complaints filed by a pro se plaintiff. Social security cases would be difficult to fit
into our larger coding scheme, present no opportunity for multiple-claim pleading, and are usually pled as a
matter of rote. The exclusion of prisoner petitions, like the exclusion of pro se plaintiffs, represents a judgment
call that these cases are unlikely to be subject to the same kinds of pleading strategies as ordinary civil
litigation. For one, they are governed by an elaborate set of rules, statutory and otherwise, which police their
content and format (See, e.g., The Prisoners Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §1997e). Notwithstanding
these regimes, our inspection of these excluded cases suggests that there remains an enormous number of
very hard to parse complaints, which would have significantly increased the likelihood of erroneous coding
for our purposes. Further study of the content and organization of these excluded complaints and choices
that are made are a topic all to their own.
6

As has been noted elsewhere by, e.g., Hadfield (2005) and Schlanger (2003), the NOS codes themselves
fall well short of being ideal for summarizing the complex content of a case. In addition, we also note that
the nature of RECAP and the way that it is populated non-randomly by users means that it is likely not
perfectly representative of overall federal cases within NOS categories. For example, within the personal
injury-torts NOS category, it is very likely that RECAP’s contents contain a higher percentage of large-scale
tort cases and fewer individual tort actions than the AO data’s distribution.

7
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cases (Williams and George 2010).7 After this data partitioning, we are left with a final
sample of 2,009 complaints, all of which were filed between 2000 and 2008.
The dark gray bars in Figure 1 depict the NOS code distribution for all cases filed
in federal district courts in 2007, as recorded by the AO. Comparing those to the light gray
bars, which display the same distribution of NOS codes for our 2,009-complaint database,
indicates that our data are over representative across most issue areas. This is due to our
exclusion, as noted above, of prisoner petition, social security, and MDL cases from our
data. When we also exclude the prisoner petition and social security cases from the AO’s
distribution of cases, as we do with Figure 1’s black bars, we can see that our data much
more closely approximate the overall distribution of cases in the federal district courts for
the remaining categories of cases. This comparison between the black bars and light gray
bars indicates that we have a lower percentage of personal injury-tort, bankruptcy, and real
property cases, a noticeably higher percentage of cases with contract, civil rights, property
rights, and other statute NOS codes, and relatively similar levels of labor, personal propertytort, forfeiture, tax, and immigration cases. Short of being able to draw a random sample
of district court complaints, we believe this distribution of data gives us the next best thing
in our quest to empirically examine the anatomy of federal complaints.
[Figure 1 about here]

B.

Categorizing Causes of Action
With a dataset of usable and relatively representative federal complaints in hand,

our next important task was to identify and categorize the causes of action within these
complaints. We began by coding each cause of action in every complaint, a task that is
greatly eased in federal complaints by relatively standardized pleadings and wide use of
labeled counts. The first step of our coding method was simple: we separately listed each
7
To identify the MDL cases within our database, we relied on the Administrative Office’s “disposition”
and “source” variables (e.g., Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 2007).
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cause of action as a distinct item. Where the plaintiff labeled the causes of actions with
counts or numbers, this task was anodyne: each count or subsection was coded as its own
cause of action. When the plaintiff failed to use divisions, we coded each clearly alleged
cause of action from the relevant paragraphs. Our method was intended to be conservative
- that is, we did not code a cause of action unless that plaintiff clearly seemed to intend to
plead one.
We excluded purported causes of action where the plaintiff simply asserted a claim
for relief - e.g. for damages, arbitration, an injunction, or attorney’s fees. In our considered
view, a claim for a particular remedy is not ordinarily or best understood as a cognizable
cause of action. Within our data, there were 480 non-MDL causes of action classified as bare
claims for relief.8 Excluding such claims, our final sample of cases contains 7,415 individual
causes of action.
Categorizing these causes of action was not as simple. We first developed a list of
general categories of causes of action, which loosely corresponded with the NOS codes, but
which also drew on our understanding of the nature of pleading practice and common formbook complaints. The result was 18 general buckets listing types of causes of action (and an
eventual 19th “obscure, unknown, or unusable” category). We list these types in the lefthand column of Table 1. Our next step was to assign each of the 7,415 causes of action to a
category. That process ranged from easy text normalization (e.g., “Breach of Contract” and
“Contract Breach” or “Warranty” and “Warrantee” claims) and the use of similar names to
describe a similar concept (e.g., wantonness and recklessness describe a similar legal claim in
tort) to more complex coding (ensuring that all causes of action, whether based in common
law or statutory in nature, objectively fit within a single category). We list notable examples
of these for each category in the middle column of Table 1. The full details of our cause of
8

In an earlier version of this paper, we included such bare claims for relief in the analysis. As we discuss
in footnote 11, the exclusion of these claims for relief from the cause of action data has a modest, but
predictable, effect on our clustering analysis. We did not, however, exclude a small number of causes of
action we label “process causes” – e.g., those seeking judicial review. Those causes of action, unlike the bare
claims of relief, are not entirely derivative on substantive actions.

9
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action classification codebook are reported in Appendix A.
In the left-hand column of Table 1 and in Figure 2, we report the descriptive statistics
for the coded cause of action categories in our data. As we can see, tort causes of action
dominate, making up over 26% of our causes of action. Also composing over 13% of the
causes of action each are the contract and civil rights-constitutional law categories.
[Table 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]

III.

Methods
To better understand the composition of civil complaints, we set out to categorize

cases based on the similarity of their individual causes of action. We utilized a quantitative
procedure known as cluster analysis which aims to objectively group similar objects based
on information found in the data (Everitt et al. 2011). Data classification like this, often
referred to as taxonomy, is commonplace in many sciences like biology, zoology, psychiatry,
and even medicine. As the work in this area argues, while classification of data through
clustering can be informative for summarizing the data, its results can provide a far more
foundational and fundamental understanding of the topic of interest. As Everitt et al. (2011)
argue:
Medicine provides a good example. To understand and treat a disease it has to
be classified, and in general the classification will have two main aims. The first
will be prediction - separating diseases that require different treatments. The
second will be to provide a basis for research aetiology [etiology] - the causes of
different types of diseases. It is these two aims that a clinician has in mind when
she makes a diagnosis (3-4).

10
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A clustering classification of civil complaints can be similarly foundational to the
development of a larger, more nuanced understanding of litigation. Just as with basic science and medicine, such classification can serve both prediction and etiological purposes.
For prediction, identifying different classes of cases can be informative for legal scholars,
practitioners, and educators and can have implications as wide-ranging as how empiricists
control for different types of cases, how law schools formulate effective curriculums, when
law firms decide to deploy specialist attorneys or pursue particular litigation strategies, and
the degree to which we can effectively predict, for example, case outcomes, case lengths,
and termination methods. Just one example of the etiological value of this type of work has
to do with the dispute formation process prior to and then following civil filings, a topic
which previous empirical research has revealed to be a treasure trove of opportunities for
understanding what cases eventually make their way through the court system (Miller and
Sarat 1980-1981; Boyd and Hoffman ND).

A.

Associational Methods in Legal Studies
Several recent papers have employed cluster analysis and other more general data

association methods – sometimes referred to as network analysis – to analyze legal data. A
number of these authors have examined opinion citations as a network, an effort that allows
them to draw inferences about the importance and strategic use of precedent and the overall
relationship between courts (Fowler et al. 2007; Lupu and Voeten 2011; Fowler and Jeon
2008). Legal scholars have also used associational data methods to analyze specialized areas
of law (Bommmarito, Katz and Isaacs-See 2011; Strandburg et al. 2006) and legal actors
(Katz and Stafford 2010).
Three recent empirical legal analyses most closely mirror that conducted here. Pleasence
et al. (2004) examine the clustering of English and Welsh individuals’ justiciable problems
and find that problems relating to the family tend to occur together (like divorce, domestic
violence, and child-related problems), as do those relating to social exclusion (e.g., homeless11
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ness and unfair police treatment) and medical negligence with mental health issues. Cross
and Lindquist (2009) and Yung (2013) use cluster analysis to group U.S. circuit court judges
based on their decision making characteristics, the results of which provide novel insight into
how to best “judge” judges and classify them based on their varying judicial characteristics.

B.

Cluster Analysis of Causes of Action
Turning to our project, we utilize spectral clustering to classify and group the cases in

our data based on the similarity of their individual causes of action. While there are a variety
of clustering methods available (Tan, Steinbach and Kumar 2005), many have parameterization issues and are biased based on the particular structure of the dataset. Spectral clustering
overcomes this by permitting the illustration of complex clusters of arbitrary shapes (Ng,
Jordan and Weiss 2001). Spectral clustering is based on graph cut theory, which takes into
account the similarity function between pairs of data points. The spectral clustering algorithm seeks to cut a weighted undirected graph into k clusters such that the edges within
each partition (for us, connections between cases) have a high weight or degree of similarity while the edges between nodes in different partitions have a low weight or dissimilarity
among cases.
To determine our clusters via spectral clustering, we (1) defined the proper similarity
measure and (2) determined the appropriate number of clusters for our data. The extended
Jaccard coefficient (similarity measure) between two case vectors ignores 0-0 matches to
prevent a large number of cases being considered similar due to not containing many of the
same causes of action. The measure also accounts for the presence of causes of action that
occur more than once in an individual complaint (Tan, Steinbach and Kumar 2005).
With the similarity measure in hand, we investigated the appropriate number of stable
clusters which captured the inherent structure in our dataset. It is reasonable to assume
that the method has captured the inherent structure in the dataset if clusters obtained on
different subsamples of our dataset are similar (a similarity measure close to 1). We clustered
12
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and compared pairs of subsamples, following Ben-Hur, Elisseeff and Guyon (2002), repeated
this 100 times, and also repeated this for different values of k. The process was completed
when, for a particular k, the distribution of similarities between pairs of subsamples stop
being concentrated close to 1 (for details see Ben-Hur, Elisseeff and Guyon (2002)). After
the experiments with our data, we determined that as k moves up to 9, there is a large
change in distribution of the similarities away from 1, indicating instability. Therefore, we
select k = 8 as the number of stable clusters.
To show that this spectral clustering defines reasonable groupings, we plot a gray-scale
image of the similarity matrices before and after the clustering in Figure 3. In the figure,
brighter pixels signify higher similarities. Before clustering, cases were randomly spread over
the dataset so there are no interesting patterns, as subfigure 3a illustrates. By contrast,
subfigure 3b on the right displays eight bright square blocks around the main diagonal,
meaning that similarities are high between cases inside our clusters. The size of each square
is relative to the number of cases present in the cluster (see Table 2 below for descriptive
statistics on the clusters).
[Figure 3 about here]
Appendix B provides the technical details of this spectral clustering, including our clustering
algorithm, our similarity measure, and the complete procedure for determining the final
number of and assignment to our eight clusters.

IV.
A.

Results
Resulting Clusters
The spectral cluster analysis thus results in eight clusters of causes of action. Each

of the eight clusters represents a discrete grouping of causes of action – that is, the kinds of
causes of action that tend to be brought together in complaints. That there are a limited
13
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number of patterns to cause of action pleading makes sense: after all, causes of action must
be based on facts that can give rise to a plausible claim for relief. There are only so many
general ways that individuals seeking recourse in federal court can be generally harmed.9
Table 2 details the distribution, both in percentages and raw numbers, of our 19 coded
causes of action across the eight clusters yielded from the analysis. Many of the categorized
causes of action rest largely within a single cluster. 92% of the constitutional law/civil rights
claims, for example, are found in cluster 6. 88% of the labor claims are in cluster 2, 69% of
the fraud claims are in cluster 3, and 81% of the regulatory claims are in cluster 8. And,
the most striking in their consistency are securities and intellectual property claims. Over
98% of securities causes of action are located in cluster 4, and 94% of intellectual property
claims lie in cluster 5. As Table 2 indicates, other claims are not nearly as predictable in
their ultimate cluster location. Agency claims split nearly evenly between clusters 3 and 6
and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action are divided largely between clusters 1, 3, and 4.
These resulting cluster locations for different types of legal claims tells us a great deal about
the breadth with which certain legal claims are pled as well as detailing, more generally, the
underlying content of cases brought in federal trial courts.
[Table 2 about here]
We look more closely at the legal composition of each cluster in Figure 4. This figure
depicts, for each cluster in our data, the percentage breakdown of causes of action.
[Figure 4 about here]
As we can see from this figure, each cluster has one or two dominant causes of action.
From the figure, we can also start to get a strong sense of patterns in the content of civil
9

It is worth noting here that we do not claim that there are only eight kinds of cases in federal court. That
would reach beyond our data. Rather, we assert that for this sample, we can say that the most replicable
cluster pattern finds eight typical groupings of causes of action: any more would divorce causes of action
that are more tightly linked together than they are separated from others and any fewer would artificially
lump together causes of action that have little to do with one another. As an anonymous reviewer notes,
clustering of kinds of causes of action together may reflect the structure, and increasing specialization, of
law firm practice.
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complaints, as measured through their combinations of causes of action, that we’re likely to
see in litigation over and over again.10 These legal patterns can be summarized as follows:
• Cluster 1: One of the most heterogeneous clusters, the plurality of the claims in
cluster 1 are of a contract nature (47%). Equitable contract claims are about 16%,
and consumer protection, fraud, and tort claims each are over 5%. A common case
falling in this cluster is a commercial contract case accompanied with a quasi-contract
claim.
• Cluster 2: This cluster contains a large number of labor cases (over 70% of causes
of action), including many claims for enforcement of ERISA plans. Contract causes
of action amount to about 13% of the cluster. A representative case assigned to this
cluster involves a lawsuit brought by a pension fund against an employer.
• Cluster 3: Tort causes of action make up the majority of this cluster, but do so
only at less than 58% of the cluster. Contract claims make up about 11%, fraud
claims 12%, and consumer protection 7%. The tort claims in this cluster are often
products liability disputes (which are often accompanied by contract-warranty claims)
and ordinary accident cases. This cluster contains products liability cases as well as
more straightforward personal injury torts.
• Cluster 4: The cluster is characterized by the presences of securities law claims (nearly
75% of causes of action in cluster) plus, to a lesser degree, breach of fiduciary duty
claims, with fraud, agency, and tort also accounting for less than 5% of the cluster
each. This cluster represents, for example, federal securities class action practice.
• Cluster 5: Cluster 5 is dominated, more than any other cluster, by two (related) causes
of action rather than one: intellectual property (53%) claims paired with consumer
10

That attorneys repeatedly attempt joinder of these kinds of causes of action does not mean that they
are properly brought together in federal court under 28 U.S.C. §1367. Our analysis simply indicates that
attorneys wished it to be so.
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protection causes of actions (39%). A representative case assigned to this cluster is a
trademark cause of action paired with one for unfair trade practices.
• Cluster 6: 70% of causes of action are civil rights/constitutional in nature. The only
other notable claim, at 17% of the cluster, is tort-based. A representative case assigned
to this cluster is an alleged Title VII violation paired with a tort like intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
• Cluster 7: Enforcement actions dominate this cluster, accounting for 67% of the
causes of action. Contract, equitable contract, and process-related causes each make up
about 10% of the cluster each. A typical cluster 7 case involves a civil forfeiture action
for money seized for violations (or intended violations) of the Controlled Substances
Act.11
• Cluster 8: Regulatory actions (74% of causes of action), in particular claims under
the Administrative Procedure Act against the United States, seeking agency action
dominate this cluster. Example cases assigned to this cluster seek adjudication of an
immigration asylum claim or seek declaratory relief based on an alleged violation of
the Endangered Species Act by the U.S. Department of Interior.
To better understand the composition of our eight clusters and how these clusters
relate to each other, we graphically and spatially depict them in Figure 5. Each point
in Figure 5 represents an individual case and the distance between points represents their
relationship to one another. Within the figure, points close together typically fall within the
same cluster, something we indicate through the use of different symbols.
11
As noted above (see footnote 8 and related text), we do not code separately listed damage or relief pleas
as causes of action in our data presented here. However, we note that when these relief claims are included
in the clustering as causes of action (in alternative modeling not reported here), their cases are frequently
assigned to cluster 7. Without relief causes of action, these cases get distributed across our clusters, since
the substantive causes of action that the enumerated relief claims are attached to are better able to influence
the ultimate cluster assignment of the case. Because of this, cluster 7 becomes much smaller, more discrete,
and more informative on the case’s internal structure.
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[Figure 5 about here]
As Figure 5 illustrates, there is significant overlap between clusters 6 (civil rights/constitutional)
and 3 (tort/contract/fraud) as well as clusters 3 and 1 (contract/equitable contract), which
the reader can observe in the middle of the figure. The remaining clusters are spread further
from each other. Indeed, the cluster which is least like the others is one in which federal securities law claims dominate (cluster 4) and which the resulting combination of legal theories
is very unlike all others in the data. From this, we can conclude that federal securities law
cases have less in common – legally – than do cases based in ordinary commercial torts and
contract claims. They rest on a set of facts and doctrine that is consequently more remote.
Some of the other cluster inter-relationships are of note. Cluster 5, which is dominated by intellectual property and consumer protection claims and is located in the bottom of the figure is, spatially speaking, very distant from, for example, cluster 6 (our civil
rights/constitutional law cluster located in the top-center of Figure 5). This sort of separation makes a great deal of legal sense, since it is difficult to imagine many shared causes of
action between these two types of cases. A similar division can be seen between cluster 8 on
the bottom right (regulatory actions) and cluster 2 on the top (labor cases).

B.

Causes of Action Relationships
With a more nuanced understanding of our eight clusters in hand, we turn now to

a closer examination of the relationship between individual causes of action. As discussed
above, the breadth of pleading practice and, more generally, liberal joinder seemingly permit
a wide array of legal claims to regularly be pled together. This is generally confirmed in
our data based on the legal composition of the cases falling into our eight clusters above.
However, since the cluster analysis is case-based, it does not provide extensive details on the
underlying causes of action, meaning we continue to lack a full understanding of how legal
claims of different types interact with each other within lawsuits.
To tackle this next step, we begin with Figure 6’s visualization of this cause of action
17
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relationship within our data. Within the figure, the nodes (shaded dots) represent the spatial
location of causes of action, with the node’s relative size indicating the frequency of the cause
of action in the data. The edges (gray lines) depict the relationship between these causes of
action, with stronger co-occurrences represented with thicker lines.
[Figure 6 about here]
As Figure 6 shows with its thick edges, contract and fraud claims are often brought
together, as are tort and contract and tort and fraud causes of action. Other strong relationships include consumer protection claims to intellectual property claims and agency and
securities causes of action to those claims involving breach of fiduciary duty. Figure 6 may
be just as interesting for what it tells us about weak relationships between certain types of
claims. Some causes of action, like those involving tax, are rather isolated. Other causes
of action that make up a sizable proportion of the data and have numerous edges, like constitutional law/civil rights, securities, and labor, simply do not have nearly as consistent of
patterns in their outward legal relationships as do tort, fraud, and contract claims. Take
labor causes of action as an example. As the figure indicates with the numerous edges bursting out from the labor node, there are a number of different cause of action relationships for
labor claims. But none of the edges are darker than others, indicating that no systematically
predictable patterns emerge.
To calculate the co-occurrence of two types of causes of action while taking into
consideration how common an individual cause of action is in our data, we use the following
statistic:

log

f (i, j)
f (i)f (j)

(1)

where f (i, j) represents the rate of co-occurrence of causes of action i and j, and f (i) and
f (j) are the rate of individual occurrence of these causes of action. The higher the calculated
co-occurrence statistic is (or, in our case, the closer it is to 0), the stronger a cause of action
18
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pairing’s relationship is. To compute f (i, j), we created and summed each cause of action
pair for each case in our data. So, for example, if a case had three causes of action, this
meant that there were three pairs: Pair (1) cause of action 1-cause of action 2, Pair (2)
cause of action 1-cause of action 3, and Pair (3) cause of action 2-cause of action 3. With
this co-occurrence rate, along with with rate of occurrence of individual causes of action,
this statistic provides insight into how strong cause of action relationships are in a way that
should extend beyond our data. Figure 7 depicts the computed results for this statistic for
the top 10% (top panel) and bottom 10% (bottom panel) of the paired causes of action in
our data.
[Figure 7 about here]
Certain patterns emerge from these paired-cause of action statistic depictions. In
particular, we can see from the figure that a number of causes of action are frequently paired
with causes of action falling in the same legal category, including securities, intellectual
property, (real) property, tax, and breach of fiduciary duty. For outward rates of cause of
action pairing, the pairing of breach of fiduciary duty with both tax and securities is quite
strong. On the low end of the co-occurrence statistic are relatively predictable weak cause
of action relationships like, for example, real property with labor, securities with civil rights,
and regulatory with intellectual property. In other words, it is just very rare for us to see these
types of causes of action being pled together in a complaint. Beyond the cause of action
relationships reported in Figure 7, the two most common cause of action pairings in our
data, tort with tort (N=3034) and civil rights/constitutional with civil rights/constitutional
(N=1802), fare relatively well under the co-occurrence statistic. The former relationship
receives a -7.12 score, which places it in the 38th percentile, while the civil rights inward
pairing comes in even stronger at -6.67 (21st percentile).
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V.

Discussion
What follows from this taxonomic exercise? Our cause of action-focused dataset illus-

trates how each complaint creates a cloud of possible legal theories: a winnowing litigation
follows until only a few, or one, is left. That one, discussed at length in a trial or appellate
opinion, suggests that the litigation was a “contract” or “constitutional” or “patent” case
(Boyd and Hoffman ND, 2010). But it was originally no such thing. The causes of action
that find their way into doctrinal exegesis are the residuum from a cluster of causes of action,
any of which might have, in another turning of the world, survived. Understanding litigation as a tournament of selection for causes of action, beyond being valuable for describing
and summarizing the anatomy of civil complaints, provides both predictive and etiological
benefits. These, we argue, can readily translate into empirical, theoretical, and practical
legal applications based on our taxonomic findings about the clustering of civil cases. In this
section, we discuss two concrete applications of studying causes of action, and then describe
some broader research paths for future work in this area.

A.

Twombly and Pleading Strategy
Examining the content of pleadings in federal courts has likely never been so relevant

as it is today with recent Supreme Court decisions in Twombly (2007) and Iqbal (2009) in the
forefront of plaintiffs’ (and, more generally, Court watchers’) minds. Even before Twombly,
federal courts were moving toward heightened scrutiny of pleading practices (Fairman 2003;
Marcus 1986). But the Twombly and Iqbal cases made the trend more salient and (arguably)
signified a change in how seriously trial courts should engage in their gatekeeping tasks. In
these decisions, the Supreme Court, explicitly repudiating old case law which discounted the
importance of the pleadings, rejected plaintiffs’ complaints both because the allegations made
were too vague and because they were implausible. This heightened scrutiny, especially in
realms with perceived high discovery costs like antitrust and environmental torts or weak(er)
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merits like civil rights and conspiracy, ordinarily would thus entail a greater degree of factual
specificity by plaintiffs seeking to comply with the Court’s demands. Twombly and Iqbal,
whatever they may mean with respect to this perceived trend toward heightened scrutiny of
pleading practice, have generated an immense outpouring of scholarly criticism (e.g., Miller
2010; Steinman 2010).
No matter the reaction, empirically assessing the effect of these cases on federal trial
court practice has proven difficult. The most comprehensive empirical analysis to date,
conducted by the Federal Judicial Center, looked at motions to dismiss filed before and after
Twombly and Iqbal and found few significant changes in courts’ grant rates (Cecil et al. 2011).
Interpreting this non-finding may be more difficult (Hoffman 2012). Putting aside concerns
about finding appropriate samples, selection bias looms large when we study the operation
of motions to dismiss. Perhaps attorneys have changed the content of their complaints –
i.e., made them “stronger” – after the pleadings revolution. All else equal, this would result
in a lower overall grant rate for filed motions to dismiss. But defense attorneys, who can
read opinions and predict district court practice, will evolve to file such motions more rarely,
saving their bullets for an especially bad complaint. That is, motion grant rates following
Twombly/Iqbal won’t fully illuminate how those decisions affected the kinds of cases which
are prosecuted in federal court (Hubbard 2011).
What may be more informative and less biased moving forward, however, is an examination similar to that which we have conducted here. By focusing first and foremost on the
content of the filing documents, we can better understand the strategy of plaintiff’s attorneys
in anticipation of the litigation to come, including what may be a more searching reading of
the 12(b)(6) standard after these two important recent Supreme Court decisions. Indeed, it
may be logical to assume that attorneys, growing concerned over the new interpretation of
Rule 8(a) to require “plausible” claims of relief, may react by pleading more facts – or more
plausible ones (Lee 2012, Table 28). Causes of action which are difficult to support with
facts immediately at hand – like conspiracy claims, or ones resting on the defendant’s intent
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– will be more difficult to allege. On net, we would thus expect that the number of causes
of action in any given complaint will decrease.
While our data do not equip us to study this systematically – after all we have
no observations occurring after Iqbal and only a relatively small number immediately after
Twombly (30% of the cases) – a preliminary look at the question of the effect of this trend
in case law on pleading breadth does show signs of promise. We plot in Figure 8 the kernel
density of the number of causes of action per case in cases in our data filed before the Court’s
decision in Twombly on May 21, 2007 (solid line) and after (gray dashed line).
[Figure 8 about here]
The figure hints at exactly what we would expect. Cases filed after Twombly have a distribution in the numbers of causes of action that is centered largely from 1 to 5, with a sharp
drop off thereafter. Cases filed before Twombly, however, have a distribution in the numbers
of causes of action that is more widely spread from 1 to 8 and includes a more gradual
downward slope in density as the number of causes of action increases. Further, descriptive
statistics and statistical tests confirm that the number of causes of action per case between
pre- and post-Twombly cases are different from one another. Cases filed pre-Twombly have
a median number of causes of action of 3, those filed after have a median of 2, and the two
medians are statistically different from each other (χ2 =16.045; p <0.01). In addition, the
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test, which is used for data that are not normally distributed, provides statistically significant evidence that the distributions of the pre- and post-Twombly
populations are not equal (z=4.785; p <0.01).
Thus, while these results are relatively preliminary in nature, they do seem to indicate
that cases filed after Twombly appear to be, on net, pled with fewer causes of action. If these
results are verified in future projects with more complaint-level data that expands into 2009,
2010, and beyond and the addition of systematic regression analysis, they will go a long way
toward confirming the evolving nature of our pleading regime and the resulting changing
strategies from attorneys in response to the change in the operative rules. Future work
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might also test if Twombly’s effect is issue area or cluster specific. Though some work on
particular issue areas – like employment litigation – has commenced, such studies are often
methodologically compromised by relying on courts’ reactions to filed motions (Noll 2010).
However, because certain types of cases were arguably already subject to heightened pleading
standards prior to Twombly, discerning the effect, if any, produced by the Supreme Court
may remain statistically difficult going forward.

B.

Clusters and Reforming NOS Codes?
This project’s systematic examination of the contents of federal complaints also

presents the opportunity to begin to evaluate the accuracy and value of NOS codes for
classifying their underlying civil lawsuits. As we note above, NOS codes are designated by
the plaintiff’s attorney at filing and are designed to summarize the case in a single code. Unquestionably, these codes serve important functions for many followers and scholars of the
federal trial courts, including aiding in the reporting of subject matter descriptive statistics
on filings and terminations and allowing scholars, including ourselves, to develop data samples for further study based on general case issue area. They have, however, been criticized
as being “extremely sketchy” (Schlanger 2003, 1699) and “not sufficiently reliable” (Eagan
2011, 6) and, more generally, are recognized as being an imperfect method for summarizing
complex underlying cases.
The clustering of cases based on complaints’ underlying content presented here creates
the potential for evaluating the reliability of NOS codes for serving this summary function.
Unlike NOS codes, which are selected by a filing attorney, clustering presents an objective
and stable classification of a case based on complaint content. To compare the clusters
produced from the cases in our data to the NOS codes selected for the same cases, we turn
to Figure 9. There, in the top panel, we depict the most frequently occurring NOS codes for
each of our eight clusters. The bottom panel provides similar information but displays the
data breakdown for the the broader NOS categories rather than the individual NOS codes.
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[Figure 9 about here]
As the bottom panel of the figure indicates, seven of the eight clusters have a relatively
homogenous NOS structure. In each of those seven clusters, a single NOS category accounts
for at least 65% of the case classifications. And, in some of these clusters, like cluster 6,
that number reaches as high as 90%. What is more, the dominant NOS category is probably
the category that would be expected given the legal content of the cluster, a conclusion that
is aided by comparing this figure with Figure 4 above. Cluster 6, our cluster containing
a large number of civil rights and constitutional law-based causes of action, is dominated
by the “civil rights” NOS category, and specifically, the 442 (Employment) and 440 (Other
Civil Rights) codes. The same is true, for example, for cluster 2, where labor-related causes
of action make up 70% of the cluster, and “Labor” NOS categories (especially code 791
(ERISA)) compose 85% of the classified cases.
This seems to be good news for NOS codes, and it probably is. However, the figure
also points to an imperfection in the NOS classification system. The fact that any cluster
contains a variety of NOS categories indicates that those cases not classified in the dominant
NOS category could well be considered to be NOS classification errors. To put this another
way, under the clustering that we have conducted, the underlying cause of action structure
of a complaint groups it with other similar cases, but the NOS classification of that case
excludes some of these cases from that grouping. If we take this interpretation to the bottom
panel of Figure 9 again, we could say that, at best, there is a 10% “error” in case grouping
with NOS categories (cluster 6) and, at worst, a 70% “error” rate (cluster 7).
Of course, this is a relatively preliminary examination of this NOS-clustering relationship, but it is one that seems to indicate that revisiting NOS codings and the way that federal
trial court cases are classified at filing could well be fruitful. Indeed, to further investigate
and implement these possibilities, we would recommend that the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts consider revising the information that they seek from filing plaintiffs’ attorneys.
One potential way that this could be done is to require the plaintiffs’ attorneys, who already
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fill out a civil cover sheet upon filing their complaints, to assign each of their pled causes
of action an NOS-like code. This would replace or augment the single case-level NOS code
assignment that currently takes place on the filed cover sheet. Applied in this way, trial
courts would be enabled to easily employ this project’s cluster assignment methodology to
each case with a simple computerized formula, all while reducing the problems implicit with
attorney error by requiring NOS-assignment at the case level.

C.

The Future of Clustering and Applications
These two illustrations do not begin to exhaust the possible applications of complaint-

level clustering. Future work, with larger datasets, may consider the following kinds of
problems, among others:
Specialized Courts or Judges The ease and usefulness of complaint clustering may revitalize the debate about the normative benefits and practical costs of having more
specialized courts (Baum 2010) or utilizing judge assignment based on expertise rather
than randomization (e.g., Cheng 2008). With evidence like ours of civil cases combining into a limited number of legal patterns, it becomes far less daunting to think about
such a change in the way we structure generalized trial courts.
Court Settlement Resources This sort of cause of action clustering evidence may provide
courts the information that they need to more effectively and efficiently determine, from
filing, when and in what cases to use court resources to push settlement.
Case Actor Strategy Clustering can also help attorneys and courts better plan for discovery and other case events. More generally, the more systematic information that
case actors have about their case and how it compares to others, the more able they
should be to make strategically wise decisions. And for scholars, clustering presents the
opportunity to examine a popular topic, like the effect of lawyer experience, specialization and party resources (e.g., Galanter 1974), in more detail, more systematically,
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and earlier in a case than ever before.
Law School Curriculum That legal claims regularly combine in the ways that we have
found may cause some to question the way that law schools silo topics into “Contracts,”
“Torts,” “Property,” “Intellectual Property,” etc. We observe significant overlap between these legal areas in practice, and it is likely that the litigation of one cause of
action will influence how another comes out.
Issue Area Controls in Empirical Work In empirical scholarship, we often use NOS
codes, opinion text searches, case headers, and keynotes to narrow in on and statistically control for specific types of cases. As is well known, each of these, in its own way,
presents a biased method of case summarization. Clustering, like we have done here,
overcomes much of this.
Case Outcomes Finally, we believe that complaint clustering can provide important information on civil case outcomes. As scholarship like Galanter (2004), Eisenberg and
Farber (1997), Clermont and Eisenberg (2002), and Clermont (2009) reveals, a case’s
“issue area” affects its likelihood of going to trial, settling, or terminating via an adversarial motion, the probability of plaintiff success, and, when successful, the amount
that is recovered. We may well be able to gather a more nuanced understanding of these
outcome-related concepts, and their probabilities upon filing, by relying on clusters of
complaints.
We recognize that this study, while the first of its kind, does have its limitations. One
such limitation has to do with representativeness and statistical inference due to our reliance
on RECAP to draw our data. Because of this reliance, it is possible that our dataset’s makeup is somehow different from all filed federal civil lawsuits. While we cannot be certain
that this is not the case, largely for the same data gathering limitations that forced us to
utilize RECAP to begin with, we believe that concerns about our data’s representativeness is
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somewhat ameliorated by the issue-level distribution of our data (but not necessarily intraissue distribution, see footnote 6) discussed above with relation to Figure 1. Our decision
to exclude pro se and prisoner petition cases also has implications for our analysis (beyond
affecting the representativeness of our data). Perhaps more seriously, we can not make
any systematic claims about the structure of state complaints.12 It is quite possible that
lawyers in Code pleading jurisdictions have different cause-of-action strategies than those
in jurisdictions whose procedural system follows the federal rules - although differences are
likely to be muted by norms and customs.

VI.

Conclusion
In this, the first systematic study of federal civil complaints, we illustrated the utility

of examining an all-but-neglected data source on attorney strategy and behavior. As it turns
out, most legal theories in the federal court sample we have gathered arise from state law
causes of action - particularly, tort and contract claims. When joined together, we found
that these underlying legal theories cohered to form predictable clusters of causes of action.
Such clusters could easily form a firmer basis for etiological inquiry into litigation than the
tools currently at hand. They might also help illuminate the effect of important changes in
legal rules on attorney strategy and judicial behavior.
Complaints have long been ignored because pleadings themselves were de-emphasized
by the Rules. Indeed, we might as well have studied how a lawyer’s use of font affected
outcomes. But in the new era of revived pleading scrutiny, it seems time to turn our attention
to a careful study of the documents which generate litigation. The project provides evidence
that such an inquiry will not be fruitless.

12

Of the cases in our data, some were undoubtedly removed from a state trial court, meaning that a small
percentage of the complaints in our data are indeed state complaints. However, since the selection process
for these complaints is quite un-random, these data do not position us well to speak about state complaints
more generally.
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VII.

Appendix A: Coding Causes of Action
Below we provide coding content details for the 18 substantive categories of causes of

action in our data. Causes of action that could not be coded in one of these 18 categories
were classified as “Obscure, Unknown, or Unusable,” our 19th cause of action category.
• Force

1. Agency
• Aiding and Abetting

• General Discrim/Access

• Premises or Supervisory Liability In
Tort

• Housing

• Respondeat Superior

• Process

• Vicarious Liability

• Race/National Origin

• Municipal/Supervisory

• Search

2. Bad Faith

• Sex

• Bad Faith

5. Consumer Protection

3. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

• Antitrust

• Breach of Fiduciary Duty-General

• Debt Collection

• Dissipation of Trust Assets
• Failure to Perform Duty As Corporate
officer

• Deceptive Trade/Business Practices
• False Advertising
• False Designation of Origin

• Waste

• Federal Misc

4. Civil Rights-Constitutional Law

• Lanham Act

• 1st Amendment (or state equivalent)

• State Whistleblower

• 5th Amendment (or state equivalent)

• Truth In Lending

• Age

• Unfair and Deceptive Practices

• Conspiracy

6. Contract

• Constitution-Non Civil Rights
• Disabilities

• Admiralty Contract

• Employment Federal and State

• Contract-General

• Employment-Age

• Contributions

• Employment-Disabilities

• Creditors Suits For Non-Payment

• Employment-Race

• Express Warranty

• Employment-Retaliation

• Good Faith and Fair Dealing

• Employment-Sex

• Implied Warranty
• Insurance

• Employment-Termination/Discharge

• Sales and Secured Transactions

• Equal Access to Justice

• Warranty-General

• Equal Protection

7. Enforcement

• Failure to Intervene
• False Arrest/Imprisonment

• Accounting
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• Attachment

• LMRA

• Audit

• Overtime/Minimum Wage

• Civil Forfeiture

12. Process Causes

• Constructive Trust

• Appeal

• Enforcement of Judgment

• Discovery-Related

• Foreclosure

• Judicial Review
• Legal Standards

8. Equitable Contract

13. Property

• Account Stated
• Equitable Estoppel

• Abandonment

• Equitable Relief

• Condemnation

• Promissory Estoppel

• Eminent Domain
• Eviction

• Quasi-Contract

• Foreclosure
9. Fraud

• Liens

• Common Law Fraud

• Nuisance

• Deceit

• Quiet Title

• Federal FCA

• Replevin

• Federal Misc

• RESPA

• Fraud-General

• Restrictive Covenant

• Fraudulent Concealment

• Trespass
14. Racketeering-Criminal Activities

• Fraudulent Conveyance
• Fraudulent Inducement

• Common Law Conspiracy

• Misrepresentation

• RICO
15. Regulatory

10. Intellectual Property
• Copyright

• Administrative Procedure Act

• Cyber Piracy/Squatting

• Attorney

• Dilution

• Bankruptcy
• CERCLA

• Patent

• Communications

• Trade Secret

• Federal

• Trademark

• FOIA

11. Labor

• General Health

• Collective Bargaining Agreement

• HAZMAT

• ERISA

• Immigration

• FEHA

• Transportation

• FELA

• Unauthorized Cable Service
16. Securities

• FISA
• FMLA

• Investment Advisers Act

• Labor - General

• Investment Company Act
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• Securities Exchange Act

• Maritime

• State Securities

• Medical Malpractice
• Negligence

17. Tax

• Outrage

• Recovery of Taxes Paid

• Palming off

18. Tort

VIII.
A.

• Premises Liability

• Conversion

• Privacy

• Defamation

• Products Liability

• Detinue

• Strict Liability

• Failure to Warn

• Tortious Breach of Contract

• Federal Tort

• Tortious Interference

• Intentional

• Wantonness

• Loss of Consortium

• Wrongful Death

Appendix B: Technical Clustering Analysis

Spectral Clustering Algorithm

Graph G=(V,E ) is specified by its vertex set, V, and edge set E. In our problem,
vertices represent cases, while edges represent connections among them. Each edge e is undirected and weighted where weight w corresponds to the similarity between cases represented
by the nodes connected by e. Weight w ranges between 0 (dissimilar cases) and 1 (identical
cases). The adjacency matrix associated with this weighted undirected graph used in the
spectral clustering algorithm is defined as:

wij
if i 6= j and (i, j) ∈ E
Aij =
0
otherwise
The objective of the spectral clustering algorithm is to cut a weighted undirected
graph into k clusters (k is predefined) such that edges within each partition have large
weight while edges between nodes in different partitions have low weight. A solution for this
multi-cut problem defined in Meila (2001) and proposed in Ng, Jordan and Weiss (2001) will
be deployed in our experiments. The method is fairly simple and easy to implement through
the following steps (Ng, Jordan and Weiss 2001):
• Define a set of cases (vertices) V = v1 , ..., vn and specify the number of clusters k
• Define the similarity measure between cases and create affinity matrix A
• Make diagonal matrix D whose (i,i ) element is the sum of A’s i -th row
1

1

• Construct matrix L = D− 2 AD− 2

• Find x1 , x2 , ..., xk the k largest eigenvectors of L and create matrix X = [x1 x2 ... xk ]
where xi is a i -th column in X
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X
• Find a matrix Y from X such that Yij = √Pij
j

2
Xij

• Treating each row of Y as a point, cluster all rows into k clusters via simple clustering
algorithm K -means (Tan, Steinbach and Kumar 2005)
• Assign case vi to cluster j if and only if row i of the matrix Y is assigned to cluster j

B.

Similarity Between Cases

Let V = {v1 , v2 , . . . , vN } be a dataset of N cases to be clustered. A case i in the
dataset can be represented as a 19-dimensional vector vi = {causeofaction1 , . . . , causeofaction19 },
where causeofactionk (k = 1, . . . , 19) denotes a count of how many times the cause of action
k appears in the case i. This vector contains many zero-valued elements and several elements
that are different from zero. The similarity measure between two case vectors ignores 0-0
matches to prevent a large number of cases being considered similar due to not containing
many of the same causes of action. Since vector elements in our dataset can be greater than
one, we will use the extended Jaccard coefficient(EJ ) (Tan, Steinbach and Kumar 2005) as
similarity measure between cases. If vi and vj are two cases then similarity between them is
calculated as
P19
k=1 vik vjk
wij = EJ (vi , vj ) = P19 2 P19
P19
2
k=1 vik vjk
k=1 vjk −
k=1 vik +
In the graph representation, the edge between vi and vj has weight wij . Calculated weights
are used to construct affinity matrix A.

C.

Number of Clusters

Our objective is to find stable clusters which capture the inherent structure in the
dataset. An effective way of discovering stable clusters based on sub-samples is described in
Ben-Hur, Elisseeff and Guyon (2002). We determine that cluster partitions are stable when
we find similar partitions when we run the clustering algorithm with different subsamples
obtained by random sampling without replacement of the original dataset. We calculate the
similarity between partitions obtained on different subsamples V1 and V2 as follows:
• find Vintersect = intersect (V1 , V2 )
• construct squared matrices C (1) and C (2) corresponding to the partitions of V1 and V2
respectively, such that for a pair of cases (vi , vj ) from V

1
if i 6= j, (vi , vj ) are f rom Vintersect and belong to the same cluster
Cij =
0
otherwise
If two partitions are similar, then cases that belong to the same cluster obtained on
set V1 would most likely belong to the same cluster obtained on set V2 . In other words,
there will be ones on the same places in both matrices C (1) and C (2) corresponding to
the partitions of sets V1 and V2 .
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• Denote
N01 - the number of 0-1 matching pairs from C (1) and C (2)
N10 - the number of 1-0 matching pairs from C (1) and C (2)
N11 - the number of 1-1 matching pairs from C (1) and C (2)
We calculate similarity between partitions made on V1 and V2 using
Sim (V1 , V2 ) =

N11
N01 + N10 + N11

To find k and to reduce search space we will explore stability for 4 ≤ k ≤ 12. We use
the following algorithm (Ben-Hur, Elisseeff and Guyon 2002):
1. Sampling rate f = 0.9 , number of iterations = 100
2. for k = 4 : 12
3.

for i = 1 : number of iterations

4.

V1 = subsample(V, f )

5.

V2 = subsample(V, f )

6.

L1 = cluster(V1 )

7.

L2 = cluster(V2 )

8.

Sik = Sim(L1 , L2 )

9.

end for

10. end for
where sampling rate f determines the fraction of the original dataset used in subsampled
sets.
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Table 1: 19 Cause of Action Categories in Data
Main Category

Notable Examples

Agency

Respondeat Superior Liability,
Vicarious Liability
Bad Faith
Breach of Fiduciary Duty,
Dissipation of Trust Assets
ADA Claims,
Employment Discrimination
Unfair and Deceptive Trade
Practices, Antitrust
Breach of Contract,
Warranty
Civil Forfeiture,
Foreclosure
Account Stated,
Equitable Estoppel
General Fraud,
Fraudulent Concealment
Trademark,
Copyright
ERISA,
Collective Bargaining
Judicial Review,
Appeal
Trespass,
Eminent Domain
Common Law Conspiracy,
RICO
Administrative Procedure Act,
CERCLA
Securities Exchange Act,
Investment Advisers Act
Recovery of Taxes Paid,
Tax Liability
Negligence, Defamation,
Wrongful Death
n/a

Bad Faith
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Civil RightsConstitutional Law
Consumer Protection
Contract
Enforcement
Equitable Contract
Fraud
Intellectual Property
Labor
Process Causes
Property
Racketeering-Criminal Activities
Regulatory
Securities
Tax
Tort

% of Causes
of Action (Raw N)
1.13% (84)
0.39% (29)
1.36% (101)
16.06% (1191)
9.32% (691)
13.89% (1030)
1.44% (107)
3.7% (274)
6.46% (479)
6.86% (509)
5.89% (437)
0.35% (26)
1.02% (76)
0.97% (72)
2.54% (188)
1.71% (127)
0.19% (14)
26.15% (1939)

Obscure, Unknown,
or Unusable
0.37% (42)
Note: The middle column lists notable examples of each category, and the right-hand
column provides descriptive statistics (percentages and raw numbers) on the distribution of
causes of action within our data. See Appendix A for further details on the coding of the
causes of action.
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Cause of action
Agency

Clusters
#1
#2
#3
#4
#5
#6
#7
#8
Total
3.57%
0 45.24%
7.14%
2.38% 40.48%
0
1.19%
100%
(3)
(0)
(38)
(6)
(2)
(34)
(0)
(1)
(84)
Bad Faith
55.17%
0 44.83%
0
0
0
0
0
100%
(16)
(0)
(13)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(29)
31.68%
4.95% 35.64% 21.78%
1.98%
0.99%
0.99%
1.98%
100%
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
(32)
(5)
(36)
(22)
(2)
(1)
(1)
(2)
(101)
Civil Rights-Constitutional Law
0.08%
1.18%
6.38%
0.08%
0 91.60%
0
0.67%
100%
(1)
(14)
(76)
(1)
(0) (1,091)
(0)
(8) (1,191)
16.64%
1.74% 26.77%
0 51.09%
3.04%
0
0.72%
100%
Consumer Protection
(115)
(12)
(185)
(0)
(353)
(21)
(0)
(5)
(691)
Contract
57.38%
6.89% 29.61%
0.19%
2.62%
2.33%
0.87%
0.10%
100%
(591)
(71)
(305)
(2)
(27)
(24)
(9)
(1) (1,030)
14.02% 19.63%
2.80%
0
4.67%
1.87% 57.01%
0
100%
Enforcement
(15)
(21)
(3)
(0)
(5)
(2)
(61)
(0)
(107)
Equitable Contract
73.72%
2.19% 13.87%
0.73%
4.74%
1.09%
2.92%
0.73%
100%
(202)
(6)
(38)
(2)
(13)
(3)
(8)
(2)
(274)
Fraud
24.43%
1.67% 69.31%
1.25%
0.63%
1.88%
0
0.84%
100%
(117)
(8)
(332)
(6)
(3)
(9)
(0)
(4)
(479)
Intellectual Property
3.14%
0
2.55%
0 93.91%
0
0.20%
0.20%
100%
(16)
(0)
(13)
(0)
(478)
(0)
(1)
(1)
(509)
Labor
0.46% 87.87%
2.52%
0
0
8.92%
0.23
0
100%
(2)
(384)
(11)
(0)
(0)
(39)
(1)
(0)
(437)
2.44%
2.44% 51.22%
0
4.88% 26.83%
0 12.20%
100%
Obscure
(1)
(1)
(21)
(0)
(2)
(11)
(0)
(5)
(41)
Process Causes
3.85%
3.85%
3.85%
3.85%
0 30.77% 38.46% 15.38%
100%
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(0)
(8)
(10)
(4)
(26)
Property
59.21%
0 28.95%
0
0 11.84%
0
0
100%
(45)
(0)
(22)
(0)
(0)
(9)
(0)
(0)
(76)
Racketeering-Criminal Activities 12.50%
1.39% 52.78%
1.39%
2.78% 27.78%
0
1.39%
100%
(9)
(1)
(38)
(1)
(2)
(20)
(0)
(1)
(72)
Regulatory
1.60%
0.53%
6.38%
0
0.53%
9.57%
0 81.38%
100%
(3)
(1)
(12)
(0)
(1)
(18)
(0)
(153)
(188)
Securities
0
0
1.57% 98.42%
0
0
0
0
100%
(0)
(0)
(2)
(125)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(127)
Tax
92.86%
0
0
0
0
7.14%
0
0
100%
(13)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(1)
(0)
(0)
(14)
Tort
3.82%
1.03% 79.53%
0.21%
0.93% 13.46%
0.05%
0.98%
100%
(74)
(20) (1,542)
(4)
(18)
(261)
(1)
(19) (1,939)
Total Causes of Action
16.94%
7.35% 36.25%
2.29% 12.22% 20.93%
1.24%
2.78%
100%
Falling within Cluster
(1,256)
(545) (2,688)
(170)
(906) (1,552)
(92)
(206) (7,415)
Note: Unless otherwise noted, percentages listed are for the row - i.e., the percent of a cause of action’s
occurrence located in a particular cluster. The raw number of causes of action for each cell is located in
parentheses.

Table 2: Distribution of 19 Categories of Causes of Action Among the 8 Clusters

Figure 1: The distribution of Nature of Suit (NOS) codes, by broad category.

Nature of Suit (NOS) Code Distribution
Contract
Personal Injury−Tort
Civil Rights
Other Statutes
Labor
Property Rights
Personal Property−Tort
Real Property
Forfeiture/Penalty
Federal Tax Suits
Immigration
Bankruptcy
Social Security
Prisoner Petitions

0
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Percent of Data

24
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32

34

36

38

Overall District Court Filings (2007)
Overall District Court Filings Excluding Prisoner Petitions and Social Security Suits
Our Data

Note: The displayed distributions are for all cases filed in federal district courts in 2007 and
for all 2007 filed cases minus those that involve prisoner petitions or social security claims.
Sources: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics,
March 31, 2007, Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER).

41
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2045733

Figure 2: The distribution of coded causes of action, by category, in data.
Tort
Civil Rights/Constitutional
Contract
Consumer Protection
Intellectual Property
Fraud
Labor
Equitable Contract
Regulatory
Securities
Enforcement
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Agency
Property
Racketeering/Criminal Activities
Obscure
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Process Causes
Tax
0
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6

8
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Percent of Causes of Action

Note: See the text, Table 1, and Appendix A for further details on the coding of causes of
action.
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Figure 3: Similarity matrices between cases before and after spectral clustering.
(a) Similarity matrix of the data before clustering

(b) Similarity matrix of the clustered data

Note: Brighter pixels on gray-scale images represent higher similarity while dark ones
indicate low similarity. Figure a is made with a random arrangement of the cases in the
dataset while data points in Figure b are arranged in cluster order, with the eight light
boxes on the diagonal indicating the clusters.
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Note: Cluster numbers are labeled on the far left of the graph. To aid in the graph’s
readability, causes of action composing 2% or less of a cluster are excluded.
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Figure 4: Causes of action composing each cluster.
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Figure 5: Fruchterman-Reingold force directed graph layout for the clusters of cases.

Figure 6: Fruchterman-Reingold force directed graph layout for the clusters of causes of
action.
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Note: The figure results from a Fruchterman-Reingold force directed graph layout for
weighted graphs. Distances between nodes (causes of action, the shaded dots) are approximately proportional to the similarity between them. A vector in which each element represents the occurrence of a certain cause of action in a particular case is assigned to the
corresponding node. The similarity between causes of actions is measured applying the extended Jaccard coefficient (described in Appendix B) to assigned vectors. The size of each
cause of action node is proportional to its incidence in the data.
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Figure 7: Dot plots of the co-occurrence statistics for causes of action pairs within the data.
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Note: The top panel of the figure depicts the co-occurrence statistics for the top 10% of
cause of action pairs while the bottom panel does the same for the bottom 10% of pairs
in our data. Both figures exclude cause of action pairs that include an “obscure” cause of
action.
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Figure 8: Kernel density plots of the number of causes of action per case.
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Note: The density plot depicts the number of causes of action per case in the data, preand post-Twombly’s decision (May 21, 2007).
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Figure 9: Percentage composition of NOS codes and categories for each cluster.
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Note: Percentage composition of NOS codes (top panel) and NOS categories (bottom panel)
for each of the clusters. For visual clarity, only those NOS codes/categories that account for
over 5% of a cluster are depicted.
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